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Abstract
It has been realized that in order to solve the measurement problem,
the physical state representing the measurement result is required to
be also the physical state on which the mental state of an observer
supervenes. This introduces an additional restriction on the solutions
to the measurement problem. In this paper, I give a new formulation
of the measurement problem which lays more stress on psychophysical
connection, and analyze whether Everett’s theory, Bohm’s theory and
dynamical collapse theories can satisfy the restriction of psychophysical
supervenience and thus can indeed solve the measurement problem.
My analysis of the potential problems of the forms of psychophysical
supervenience required by Everett’s and Bohm’s theories suggests that
dynamical collapse theories might provide a promising solution to the
measurement problem. Finally, by further analyzing how the mental
state of an observer supervenes on her wave function, I also propose a
possible solution to the structured tails problem of dynamical collapse
theories.
1 Introduction
The measurement problem is a long-standing problem of quantum mechan-
ics. The theory assigns a wave function to an appropriately prepared physi-
cal system and specifies that the evolution of the wave function is governed
by the Schro¨dinger equation. However, when assuming the wave function
is a complete description of the system, the linear dynamics is apparently
incompatible with the appearance of definite results of measurements on the
system. This leads to the measurement problem. Maudlin (1995a) gave a
precise formulation of the problem in terms of the incompatibility. Corre-
spondingly, the three approaches to avoiding the incompatibility lead to the
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three main solutions to the measurement problem: Everett’s theory, Bohm’s
theory and dynamical collapse theories. It is widely thought that these the-
ories can indeed solve the measurement problem, although each of them still
has some other problems.
On the other hand, it has been realized that the measurement problem of
quantum mechanics is essentially the determinate-experience problem (Bar-
rett, 1999). In the final analysis, the problem is to explain how the linear
dynamics can be compatible with the existence of definite experiences of
conscious observers. This requires that the physical state representing the
measurement result should be also the physical state on which the mental
state of an observer supervenes,1 thus introducing an additional important
restriction on the solutions to the problem. However, this aspect of the mea-
surement problem is ignored in Maudlin’s (1995a) formulation. Moreover,
although there have been some discussions on psychophysical supervenience
in a particular solution to the measurement problem (e.g. Brown, 1996;
Barrett, 1999; Brown and Wallace, 2005; Lewis, 2007), a systematic analy-
sis of psychophysical supervenience in all main solutions to the measurement
problem seems still missing in the literature. In this paper, I will first give
a new formulation of the measurement problem which gives prominence to
the psychophysical connection, and then analyze whether each of the three
main solutions to the measurement problem can satisfy the restriction of
psychophysical supervenience, and thus can indeed solve the measurement
problem.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I first introduce Maudlin’s
conventional formulation of the measurement problem, and then suggest a
new formulation of the problem which lays more stress on the aspect of psy-
chophysical supervenience. It is pointed out that the three main solutions to
the measurement problem correspond to three different forms of psychophys-
ical supervenience. In Section 3, Everett’s theory is analyzed. The theory
requires that the mental state of an observer cannot always supervene on
her whole wave function, and especially, for a post-measurement wave func-
tion it supervenes on certain branches of the wave function. It is argued
that this form of partial psychophysical supervenience seems problematic,
and resorting to decoherence may lead to a further problem. In Section
4, the problems of Bohm’s theory relating to psychophysical supervenience
are analyzed. It is argued that the two suggested forms of psychophysical
supervenience meet difficulties. In particular, the well-accepted form of psy-
chophysical supervenience (i.e. the form that the mental state supervenes
only on the positions of Bohmian particles) may also lead to an inconsis-
tency problem besides the problem of allowing superluminal signaling. In
Section 5, dynamical collapse theories are analyzed. It is pointed out that
1In this paper I will not consider the possibility that there is no physical state repre-
senting the measurement result on which the mental state of an observer may supervene.
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although these theories are favored by the above analysis of psychophysical
supervenience, they are also plagued by a few serious problems such as the
structured tails problem. A possible solution to this problem is proposed
based on a further analysis of how the mental state of an observer supervenes
on her wave function. Conclusions are given in the last section.
2 A new formulation of the measurement problem
According to Maudlin’s (1995a) formulation, the measurement problem orig-
inates from the incompatibility of the following three claims:
(C1). the wave function of a physical system is a complete description
of the system;
(C2). the wave function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical
equation, e.g. the Schro¨dinger equation;
(C3). each measurement has a definite result (which is one of the possible
measurement results whose probability distribution satisfies the Born rule).
The proof of the inconsistency of these three claims is familiar. Suppose
a measuring device M measures the x-spin of a spin one-half system S that
is in a superposition of two different x-spins 1/
√
2(|up〉S+ |down〉S). If (C2)
is correct, then the state of the composite system after the measurement
must evolve into the superposition of M recording x-spin up and S being
x-spin up and M recording x-spin down and S being x-spin down:
1/
√
2(|up〉S |up〉M + |down〉S |down〉M ). (1)
The question is what kind of state of the measuring device this represents.
If (C1) is also correct, then this superposition must specify every physical
fact about the measuring device. But by symmetry of the two terms in
the superposition, this superposed state cannot describe a measuring device
recording either x-spin up or x-spin down. Thus if (C1) and (C2) are correct,
(C3) must be wrong.
It can be seen that there are in general three approaches to solving the
measurement problem thus formulated. The first approach is to deny the
claim (C1), and add some additional variables and corresponding dynamics
to explain the appearance of definite measurement results. A well-known
example is Bohm’s theory (Bohm, 1952). The second approach is to deny
the claim (C2), and revise the Schro¨dinger equation by adding some non-
linear and stochastic evolution terms to explain the appearance of definite
measurement results. Such theories are called dynamical collapse theories
(Ghirardi, 2011). The third approach is to deny the claim (C3), and as-
sume the existence of many equally real worlds to accommodate all possible
results of measurements (Everett, 1957; DeWitt and Graham, 1973). In
this way, it may also explain the appearance of definite measurement results
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in each world including our own world. This approach is called Everett’s
interpretation of quantum mechanics or Everett’s theory.
It has been realized that the measurement problem in fact has two levels:
the physical level and the mental level, and it is essentially the determinate-
experience problem (Barrett, 1999). The problem is not only to explain
how the linear dynamics can be compatible with the existence of definite
measurement results obtained by physical devices, but also, and more im-
portantly, to explain how the linear dynamics can be compatible with the
existence of definite experiences of conscious observers. However, the mental
aspect of the measurement problem is ignored in Maudlin’s (1995a) formu-
lation. Here I will suggest a new formulation of the measurement problem
which lays more stress on the psychophysical connection. In this formula-
tion, the measurement problem originates from the incompatibility of the
following two claims:
(P1). the mental state of an observer supervenes on her wave function;
(P2). the wave function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical
equation, e.g. the Schro¨dinger equation.
The proof of the inconsistency of these two claims is similar to the above
proof. Suppose an observer M measures the x-spin of a spin one-half system
S that is in a superposition of two different x-spins, 1/
√
2(|up〉S + |down〉S).
If (P2) is correct, then the physical state of the composite system after the
measurement will evolve into the superposition of M recording x-spin up
and S being x-spin up and M recording x-spin down and S being x-spin
down:
1/
√
2(|up〉S |up〉M + |down〉S |down〉M ). (2)
If (P1) is also correct, then the mental state of the observer M will supervene
on this superposed wave function. Since the mental states corresponding to
the physical states |up〉M and |down〉M differ in their mental content, the
observer M being in the superposition (2) will have a conscious experience
different from the experience of M being in each branch of the superposition
by the symmetry of the two branches. In other words, the record that M
is consciously aware of is neither x-spin up nor x-spin down when she is
physically in the superposition (2). This is inconsistent with experimental
observations. Therefore, (P1) and (P2) are incompatible.
By this new formulation of the measurement problem, we can look at
the three major solutions of the problem from a new angle. First of all, the
solution to the measurement problem must deny either the claim (P1) or
the claim (P2). If (P1) is correct (as usually thought), then (P2) must be
wrong. In other words, if the mental state of an observer supervenes on her
wave function, then the Schro¨dinger equation must be revised and the solu-
tion to the measurement problem will be along the direction of dynamical
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collapse theories. On the other hand, if (P2) is correct, then (P1) must be
wrong. This means that if the wave function always evolves in accord with
the Schro¨dinger equation, then the mental state of an observer cannot su-
pervene on her wave function. There are two other forms of psychophysical
supervenience. One is that an observer may have many mental states and
these mental states supervene on certain branches of her wave function,2
and the other is that the mental state of an observer supervenes on other
additional variables. The first form corresponds to Everett’s theory, and the
second form corresponds to Bohm’s theory.
To sum up, the three major solutions to the measurement problem cor-
respond to three different forms of psychophysical supervenience. In fact,
there are only three types of physical states on which the mental state of
an observer may supervene, which are (1) the wave function, (2) certain
branches of the wave function, and (3) other additional variables. The ques-
tion is: Exactly what physical state does the mental state of an observer
supervene on? It can be expected that an analysis of this question will help
solve the measurement problem.
3 Everett’s theory
I will first analyze Everett’s theory. The theory claims that for the above
post-measurement state (2) there are two observers, and each of them is
consciously aware of a definite record, either x-spin up or x-spin down.3
There are in general two ways of understanding the notion of multi-
plicity in Everett’s theory. One is the strong form which claims that there
are two physical observers (in material content) after the quantum mea-
surement (e.g. DeWitt and Graham, 1973). The resulting theory is called
many-worlds theory. In this theory, a physical observer always has a unique
mental state, and the mental state also supervenes on the whole physical
state of the observer, although which may be only a branch of the superposed
wave function. Thus this theory is consistent with the common assumption
of psychophysical supervenience, according to which the mental state of a
physical observer supervenes on her whole physical state. As is well known,
however, this theory has serious problems such as violation of mass-energy
conservation and inconsistency with the dynamical equations (Albert and
Loewer, 1988). The problem of inconsistency can also be seen as follows.
2If an observer always has a unqiue mental state and the mental state supervenes only
on a certain branch of her wave function, then the psychophysical supervenience will be
obviously violated. This is the case of the single-mind theory (Albert and Loewer, 1988;
Barrett, 1999). Although I will not discuss this theory below, some of my analyses also
apply to this theory.
3Note that in Wallace’s (2012) latest formulation of Everett’s theory the number of
the emergent observers after the measurement is not definite due to the imperfectness of
decoherence. I will discuss this point later.
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The existence of many worlds is only relative to decoherent observers, not
relative to non-decoherent observers, who can measure the whole superpo-
sition corresponding to the many worlds (e.g. by protective measurements)
and confirm that there is no increase in the total mass-energy and number
of particles.
The other way of understanding the notion of multiplicity is the weak
form which claims that there is one physical observer (in material content),
but there are two mental observers or two mental states of the same physical
observer, after the quantum measurement (e.g. Zeh, 1981). Wallace’s (2012)
latest formulation of Everett’s theory is arguably this view in nature (see
also Kent, 2010).4 In order to derive the multiplicity prediction of the weak
form of Everett’s theory, a physical observer cannot always have a unique
mental state, and when she has more than one mental states, each mental
state does not supervene on her whole physical state either. For example,
when the observer is in one of the two physical states |up〉M and |down〉M ,
she has a unique mental state and the mental state also supervenes on her
whole physical state. While when she is in a superposition of these two
physical states such as (2), she has two mental states but each mental state
does not supervene on her whole physical state; rather, each mental state
supervenes only on a part of the whole physical state, such as one of the two
terms in the superposition (2). Therefore, different from the strong form of
Everett’s theory, the weak form of Everett’s theory obviously violates the
common assumption of psychophysical supervenience.5
One may argue that the psychophysical supervenience is not really vi-
olated here, since the sum of all mental states of a physical observer do
supervene on her whole physical state. However, this argument is prob-
lematic. First of all, since these mental states may be incompatiable with
each other, the sum of these mental states is arguably not a valid mental
state. For instance, the combination of the mental state of seeing a cat
and the mental state of not seeing a cat seems meaningless. Thus, strictly
speaking, this form of supervenience is not really a form of psychophysi-
cal supervenience. Next, as Barrett (1999, p.196) has argued, if one wants
psychophysical supervenience, then one presumably wants the mental state
4In Wallace’s formulation, it is claimed that there are also two emergent physical
observers after the quantum measurement, but their existence is only in the sense of
branch structure (i.e. the structure of certain parts of the whole physical state), not in
the sense of material content. Therefore, strictly speaking, there is only one physical
observer with her whole physical state in Wallace’s formulation. If such a theory is also
regarded as a many-worlds theory, then these worlds should be not physical worlds but
mental worlds.
5The common assumption of psychophysical supervenience is arguably reasonbale. A
whole physical state is independent, while any two parts of the state are not independent;
once one part is selected, the other part will be also fixed. Since a mental state is usually
assumed to be autonomous, it is arguably that a mental state supervenes on a whole
physical state, not on any part of the state.
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that determines one’s experience and the only mental state to which one has
epistemic access to supervene on one’s physical state. But in the weak form
of Everett’s theory, when a physical observer has many mental states, each
mental observer can only have epistemic access to her own mental state, and
thus the sum of all these mental states is certainly not a mental state that
satisfies this requirement of psychophysical supervenience.
Certainly, one may also insist that the common assumption of psy-
chophysical supervenience is not valid in general in the quantum domain.
But even though this is true, one still needs to explain why, in particular,
why this assumption applies to the physical states |up〉M and |down〉M , but
not to any superposition of them. This is similar to the preferred basis
problem. It seems that the only difference one can think is that being in the
superposition the physical observer has no definite mental state which con-
tains a definite conscious experience about the measurement result, while
being in each branch of the superposition, |up〉M or |down〉M , she has a
definite mental state which contains a definite conscious experience about
the measurement result. However, it has been argued that the common
assumption of psychophysical supervenience can also be applied to general
quantum superpositions, and moreover, under this assumption a physical
observer being in a post-measurement superposition such as (2) also has a
definite mental state which contains a definite conscious experience about
the measurement result (Gao, 2016). Note that these analyses also apply
to the many-minds theory, which is similar to the weak form of Everett’s
theory in many aspects (Albert and Loewer, 1988; Barrett, 1999).
Finally, I will give a brief comment on the relationship between Everett’s
theory and decoherence. It is usually thought that the appearance of many
observers after a quantum measurement is caused by decoherence. However,
even if this claim is true for the strong form of Everett’s theory, it seems that
it cannot be true for the weak form of the theory. The reason is that the
generation of a superposed state of a physical observer (e.g. a superposition
of two physical states |up〉M and |down〉M ), as well as the psychophysical
supervenience, have nothing to do with decoherence. Indeed, the weak form
of Everett’s theory is more like a many-minds theory than like a many-worlds
theory.
In addition, resorting to decoherence seems to cause a further difficulty
for the application of the doctrine of psychophysical supervenience. Since
decoherence is never perfect, there will be no definite parts of the whole
physical state on which the mental states can supervene. This objection
also applies to Wallace’s (2012) formulation of Everett’s theory, which is
arguably a weak form of the theory. Note again that in the weak form of
Everett’s theory the observer still has a whole physical state after a quantum
measurement. In my opinion, it is the failure to clearly distinguish between
the weak form and the strong form of Everett’s theory in the literature that
causes much confusion in understanding Everett’s theory (see also Kent,
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2010).
4 Bohm’s theory
Let us now turn to Bohm’s theory. It has been realized that an analy-
sis of psychophysical supervenience in Bohm’s theory is also relevant and
necessary (Brown, 1996). In this theory, there are two suggested forms of
psychophysical supervenience. The first one is that the mental state super-
venes on the branch of the wave function occupied by the Bohmian particles.
The second one is that the mental state supervenes only on the (relative)
positions of Bohmian particles.
The first form of psychophysical supervenience has been the standard
view until recently, according to which the mental state of an observer be-
ing in a post-measurement superposition like (2) supervenes only on the
branch of the superposition occupied by the Bohmian particles. Indeed,
Bohm initially assumed this form of psychophysical supervenience. He said:
“the packet entered by the apparatus [hidden] variable... determines the
actual result of the measurement, which the observer will obtain when she
looks at the apparatus.” (Bohm, 1952, p.182). In this case, the role of the
Bohmian particles is merely to select the branch from amongst the other
non-overlapping branches of the superposition. Brown and Wallace (2005)
called this assumption Bohm’s result assumption, and they have presented
some arguments against it (see also Stone, 1994; Brown, 1996; Zeh, 1999;
Lewis, 2007).
According to Brown and Wallace (2005), in the general case each of the
non-overlapping branches in the final joint-system configuration space wave-
function has the same credentials for representing a definite measurement
result as the single branch does in the predictable case (i.e. the case in
which the measured system is in an eigenstate of the measured observable).
The fact that only one of them carries the Bohmian particles does nothing
to remove these credentials from the others, and adding the particles to the
picture does not interfere destructively with the empty branches either. In
my view, the main problem with this form of psychophysical supervenience
is that the empty branches and the occupied branch have the same qual-
ification to be supervened by the mental state. Moreover, although it is
imaginable that the Bohmian particles may have influences on the occupied
branch, e.g. disabling it from being supervened by the mental state, it is
hardly imaginable that the Bohmian particles have influences on all other
empty branches, e.g. disabling them from being supervened by the mental
state.
In view of the first form of psychophysical supervenience being problem-
atic, most Bohmians today seem to support the second form of psychophys-
ical supervenience (e.g. Holland, 1993, p.334), although they sometimes
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do not state it explicitly (e.g. Maudlin, 1995b). At first sight, if assum-
ing this form of psychophysical supervenience, namely assuming the mental
state supervenes only on the (relative) positions of Bohmian particles, then
it seems that the above problems can be avoided. However, it has been
argued that this form of psychophysical supervenience is inconsistent with
the popular functionalist approach to consciousness (Brown and Wallace,
2005; see also Bedard, 1999). The argument can be summarized as follows.
If the functionalist assumption is correct, for consciousness to supervene on
the Bohmian particles but not the wavepackets, the Bohmian particles must
have some functional property that the wavepackets do not share. But the
functional behaviour of the Bohmian particles is arguably identical to that
of the wavepacket in which they reside. Moreover, this form of psychophys-
ical supervenience also leads to another problem of allowing superluminal
signaling (Brown and Wallace, 2005; Lewis, 2007). If the mental state su-
pervenes on the positions of Bohmian particles, then an observer can in
principle know the configuration of the Bohmian particles in her brain with
a greater level of accuracy than that defined by the wave function. This
will allow superluminal signaling and lead to a violation of the no-signalling
theorem (Valentini, 1992).6
A more serious problem with the second form of psychophysical super-
venience, in my view, is that it seems inconsistent with the Born rule.7
Consider again an observer being in the post-measurement superposition
(2). According to the Born rule, the modulus squared of the amplitude of
each branch of this superposition represents the probability of obtaining the
measurement result corresponding to the branch. For example, the modulus
squared of the amplitude of the branch |up〉M represents the probability of
obtaining the x-spin up result. This means that the Born rule requires that
the quantities that representing the measurement results should be corre-
lated with these branches of the superposition.8 Then, in order that the
measurement result is represented by the relative positions of the Bohmian
particles as required by the second form of psychophysical supervenience,
there must exist a correspondence between different branches of the super-
position and different relative positions of the Bohmian particles, and in
particular, the relative positions of the Bohmian particles corresponding to
different branches of the superposition must be different.
However, Bohm’s theory does not give such a corresponding relation-
6In my view, this problem is not as serious as usually thought, since the existence of
such superluminal signaling is not inconsistent with experience, and superluminal signaling
may also exist in other theories such as dynamical collapse theories (Gao, 2004, 2014d).
7This inconsistency problem originates only from the assumption that the measurement
result is represented by the positions of the Bohmian particles, and it is independent of
the psychophysical connection.
8Note that this requirement is independent of whether the wave function is ontic or
not.
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ship, and thus it is at least incomplete when assuming the second form of
psychophysical supervenience. Moreover, it can be argued that the corre-
sponding relationship does not exist. The probability of the Bohmian par-
ticles appearing at a location in configuration space is equal to the modulus
squared of the amplitude of the wave function at the location. It is permitted
by the linear dynamics that one branch of the post-measurement superposi-
tion (2) is a spatial translation of the other branch, e.g. the spatial part of
|down〉M is ψ(x1, x2, t), and the spatial part of |up〉M is ψ(x1 + a, x2 + a, t).
Then if a relative configuration of the Bohmian particles appears in the re-
gion of one branch in configuration space, it may also appear in the region of
the other branch in configuration space. Moreover, the probability densities
that the configuration appears in both regions are the same. This means
that a relative configuration of the Bohmian particles can correspond to ei-
ther branch of the superposition, and there does not exist a corresponding
relationship between different branches of the superposition and different
relative configurations of the Bohmian particles. As a result, if the mea-
surement result is represented by the relative positions of the Bohmian par-
ticles as required by the second form of psychophysical supervenience, then
no matter which branch of the superposition the Bohmian particles reside
in after the measurement, the measurement result will be the same. This
is obviously inconsistent with the Born rule. Note that this inconsistency
problem not only exists for the above special type of superpositions, but
also exists for most post-measurement superpositions, for each of which the
probability densities that a relative configuration of the Bohmian particles
appears in the regions of two of its non-overlapping branches are both larger
than zero.
Finally, I note that the above analysis of psychophysical supervenience
also raises a doubt about the whole strategy of Bohm’s theory to solve
the measurement problem. Why add hidden variables such as positions of
Bohmian particles to quantum mechanics? It has been thought that adding
these variables which have definite values at every instant is enough to ensure
the definiteness of measurement results and further solve the measurement
problem. However, if the mental state cannot supervene on these additional
variables, then even though these variables have definite values at every
instant, they are unable to account for our definite experience and thus do
not help solve the measurement problem.
5 Dynamical collapse theories
I have argued that one will meet some difficulties if assuming the mental state
of an observer supervenes either on certain branches of her wave function or
on other additional variables, and thus it seems that Everett’s and Bohm’s
theories are not promising solutions to the measurement problem. This also
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suggests that the mental state of an observer supervenes directly on her wave
function, and dynamical collapse theories may be in the right direction to
solve the measurement problem. In some sense, these arguments can be
seen as a further development of von Neumann’s (1955) argument for the
collapse postulate based on the doctrine of psychophysical parallelism.
However, it has been known that dynamical collapse theories are still
plagued by a few serious problems such as the tails problem (Albert and
Loewer, 1996). In particular, the structured tails problem has not been
solved in a satisfactory way (see McQueen, 2015 and references therein).
The problem is essentially that dynamical collapse theories such as the GRW
theory predicts that the post-measurement state is still a superposition of
different outcome branches with similar structure (although the modulus
squared of the coefficient of one branch is close to one), and they need to
explain why high modulus-squared values are macro-existence determiners
(McQueen, 2015). In my view, the key to solving the structured tails prob-
lem is not to analyze the connection between high modulus-squared values
and macro-existence, but to analyze the connection between these values
and our experience of macro-existence, which requires us to further analyze
how the mental state of an observer supervenes on her wave function.
Admittedly this is an unsolved, difficult issue, but I will give a few spec-
ulations here. I conjecture that the mental content of an observer being in a
post-measurement superposition like (2) is composed of the mental content
corresponding to every branch of the superposition, and in particular, the
modulus squared of the amplitude of each branch determines the vividness
of the mental content corresponding to the branch (Gao, 2016). Under this
assumption, when the modulus squared of the amplitude of a branch is close
to zero, the mental content corresponding to the branch will be the least
vivid. It is conceivable that below a certain threshold of vividness an or-
dinary observer or even an ideal observer will not be consciously aware of
the corresponding mental content. Then even though in dynamical collapse
theories the post-measurement state of an observer is still a superposition of
different outcome branches with similar structure, the observer can only be
consciously aware of the mental content corresponding to the branch with
very high amplitude, and the mental content corresponding to the branches
with very low amplitude will not appear in the whole mental content of the
observer. This may solve the structured tails problem of dynamical collapse
theories.
6 Conclusions
It has been realized that the measurement problem, in the final analysis, is
to explain how the linear quantum dynamics can be compatible with the
existence of definite experiences of conscious observers. This requires that
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the physical state representing the measurement result should be also the
physical state on which the mental state of an observer supervenes, thus
introducing an important restriction on the solutions to the measurement
problem. However, the mental aspect of the measurement problem has been
ignored in the conventional formulation of the problem, and a systematic
analysis of psychophysical supervenience in the solutions to the problem
is also missing in the literature. In this paper, I give a new formulation
of the measurement problem which lays more stress on the psychophysical
connection, and analyze whether the three main solutions to the problem,
namely Everett’s theory, Bohm’s theory and dynamical collapse theories, can
satisfy the restriction of psychophysical supervenience and thus can indeed
solve the problem. The analysis suggests that dynamical collapse theories
may be in the right direction to solve the measurement problem. Finally, I
also propose a possible solution to the structured tails problem of dynamical
collapse theories by a further analysis of psychophysical supervenience.
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